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Active Labor Market Policy: 
New and Received Wisdom 
Anders Forslund and Alan B. Krueger 
A visitor to Sweden is struck by the breadth and generosity of the labor market 
programs designed to limit the adverse effects of unemployment and expand 
employment. These programs include extensive job training, public sector re- 
lief work, recruitment subsidies, youth programs, mobility bonuses, and unem- 
ployment benefits. About 3 percent of  GNP was spent on government labor 
market programs in Sweden in 1990, compared to 2 percent in Germany and 
less than 0.5 percent in the United States. Several prominent observers have 
argued that the active Swedish labor market policies are responsible for the 
enviable unemployment experience of Sweden in the 1970s and 1980s. Layard, 
Nickell, and Jackman (1991, 473) go so far as to recommend that Sweden’s 
“active labor market” programs serve as a model for other countries. 
Figure 6.1 illustrates the Swedish unemployment rate semiannually over the 
past twenty-five years. In the 1970s, Sweden managed to maintain a low unem- 
ployment rate in the face of  adverse oil price shocks that caused high unem- 
ployment  and  severe recessions  in  other  industrialized  countries.  The un- 
employment rate in Sweden also remained low in the 1980s, while it trended 
upward in other European countries. But a dramatic increase in the unemploy- 
ment rate can be  seen beginning in  1991. In July  1993, the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics calculated that the unemployment rate in Sweden reached 9.5 
percent, on a comparable basis to the U.S. unemployment concept. The U.S. 
rate at the same time was 6.8 percent. For the first time in our lifetimes, the 
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Fig. 6.1  Swedish unemployment rate, by half year, 1970-93 
unemployment rate is higher in Sweden than in the United States! The dra- 
matic increase in unemployment in Sweden over the last two years casts doubt 
on the ability of  the active labor market policies to blunt unemployment. At 
the same time, Sweden’s history of  low unemployment in the 1980s suggests 
that its labor market programs are not responsible for the 1991-93  downturn 
because the programs were substantially as generous in the  1980s as in the 
early 1990s. 
The expense of the Swedish labor market programs may be justifiable if they 
produce benefits that exceed their costs. But the programs are a very expensive 
luxury if unemployment is high and if the programs are not effective at reduc- 
ing unemployment or raising workers’ skills. Given the rising level of unem- 
ployment and other changes in the Swedish economy, an assessment of  the 
effectiveness of the active labor market programs is especially timely. 
As the pattern in figure 6.1 suggests, macroeconomic indicators can give a 
possibly misleading indication of the efficacy of  Sweden’s labor market poli- 
cies. In this paper, we first review microeconometric evidence on two major 
active labor market programs in Sweden: public relief work and job training. 
One concern with public relief work is that such programs may displace other 
workers. We provide new evidence on “fiscal substitution” between public re- 
lief workers and other workers using county-level data. Specifically, we find 
evidence that public relief workers tend to displace private construction work- 
ers, which potentially limits the usefulness of public relief workers in reducing 
unemployment. The evidence is less clear on whether relief workers displace 269  An Evaluation of the Swedish Active Labor Market Policy 
social welfare workers, which is another major sector in which relief workers 
are dispatched. 
We also review previous evidence on the effect of job-training programs on 
wages and reemployment probabilities. Owing to the small samples used in 
past  studies, we find it very difficult to draw precise conclusions about the 
payoff  to job-training  programs. In sum, our view  of  the microeconometric 
evidence is that one should remain agnostic about the effectiveness  of job- 
training and public relief programs in fighting unemployment. 
We  then  attempt  to reconcile  the  macroeconomic  and  international  evi- 
dence-which  has been cited by many as support for the effectiveness of Swe- 
den’s active labor market programs-with  the microeconometric evidence. We 
first provide  evidence on the  stability of  the Beveridge  curve in  the  1980s 
across counties in Sweden. One possible explanation for the stable Beveridge 
curve is that rapid expansion of public sector employment has absorbed unem- 
ployed workers. We test this hypothesis with county-level data and find little 
support for it. Second, we evaluate and update the cross-country unemploy- 
ment rate analysis that Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991) and others have 
performed. Using 1993 unemployment rate data, we find that greater spending 
on active labor market programs has a statistically insignificant  and positive 
effect on unemployment. This finding is in sharp contrast with estimates for 
the 1980s. We also discuss several statistical limitations of the cross-country 
approach. 
Finally, we present evidence on the reaction of employment and unemploy- 
ment to regional shocks in Sweden. Specifically, we compare our findings on 
regional  evolutions in  Sweden  to comparable  results  for the  United  States 
based on Blanchard and Katz (1992) and for the rest of Europe based on De- 
cressin  and  Fatas  (1993). These results  suggest  that  Sweden’s response  to 
shocks is not particularly  different from other countries’, implying that Swe- 
den’s extensive labor market programs have not had a marked effect on regional 
labor market adjustments. 
In our judgment, the evidence provides little support for the view that Swe- 
den’s past success in maintaining low unemployment stemmed primarily from 
its active labor market policies. On the other hand, the extensive labor market 
programs  in Sweden are most likely not the cause of  Sweden’s current eco- 
nomic crisis, But our analysis of the evolution of unemployment suggests that 
there is a real danger that the current high level of unemployment will persist 
for some time in the future. We conclude by  considering policies that might 
help  improve  the  active  labor  market  programs  in  the  current  economic 
climate. 
6.1  Overview of Programs 
By way of background, it should be noted that, within the central blue-collar 
trade union (LO) in the early 1950s, the question of how to combine full em- 270  Anders Forslund and Alan B. Krueger 
ployment and price stability was discussed.‘ These discussions led to the for- 
mulation of a program subsequently adopted by the Social Democratic govern- 
ment, based on a few cornerstones,  one of  which was active labor market 
policies. First, LO would pursue a so-called  solidaristic wage policy. In its 
original form, this policy aimed at “equal pay for equal work,” irrespective of 
the productivity levels of individual firms. Later, the policy principle (still un- 
der the same name) changed to one of  unconditional wage equalization, or 
“equal pay for unequal work.” Second, a strict stance of stabilization policies 
(primarily fiscal policy) was advocated in order to keep inflation low. One in- 
tended result of these two principles was shut downs of low-productivity firms 
and layoffs. This motivated the third cornerstone of the program, “active labor 
market policies,” which were given the role of transferring laid-off workers to 
expanding high-productivity firms. 
Two points about the origin of the programs are worth noting. First, labor 
market policies are not considered a substitute for stabilization policies. Sec- 
ond, labor market policies entail the so-called work principle-the  aim of the 
programs is to accomplish a smooth and rapid transfer of laid-off workers to 
new  employment rather  than  to  provide  welfare  for the unemployed  (i.e., 
“workfare” rather than welfare). Starting in the 1950s, a system of manpower 
policy emerged based on active labor market policies. The present system can 
be described in terms of the following main ingredients: unemployment insur- 
ance, measures to create employment, mobility-enhancing measures, and mea- 
sures targeted at the handicapped. 
6.1.1  Unemployment Insurance 
Unemployment compensation is provided in two forms: First, there are a 
number of so-called certified unemployment insurance (UI) funds, run by the 
trade unions at the industry level, but to a large extent tax financed. In 1990, 
the coverage was slightly less than 80 percent of  the labor force. Second, in 
addition to the UI system administered by the trade unions, since 1974 there 
has also been a supplementary compensation system (kontant arbetsmarknads- 
stod, KAS), mainly designed for new entrants in the labor market, who usually 
are not members of any UI fund. UI fund members are entitled to compensa- 
tion for 300 days (450 days for workers over age fifty-five), whereas cash bene- 
fit assistance runs for 150 days (300 days for those over age fifty-five, 450 days 
for those over age sixty). Daily compensation in the UI fund system is, within 
limits, fixed by the government regulating minimum and maximum levels at 
80 percent (90 percent before 5 July  1993) of the recipient’s normal income 
prior to unemployment. The level of compensation in cash benefit assistance 
is significantly lower than the average paid by the certified UI funds (in 1990, 
SKr 174 vs. SKr 402 per day). Carling et al. (1996) find that the duration of 
I.  For excellent overviews of  the  labor  market  programs,  see  Bjorklund  (1990), Calmfors 
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unemployment spells for those on KAS benefits is only slightly shorter than 
for those on UI benefits, in spite of the large benefit differential. 
A special feature of the UI fund system is that fund coverage roughly coin- 
cides with wage-bargaining units, as the funds are run by trade unions at the 
industry level. But the state grants to the UI funds are designed  so that the 
marginal cost of extra unemployment among a fund’s members is zero.2 
A number of criteria, many of which are common to the UI funds and KAS, 
have to be met in order for a person to be entitled to unemployment compensa- 
tion. The two most important conditions are that recipients actively search for 
a job at a public employment office and that an offer of “suitable” work must 
be accepted. Refusal to accept a job offer might lead to expulsion from com- 
pensation. To receive compensation from a UI fund, a “membership condition” 
and a “work condition” have to be met: the claimant must have paid member- 
ship fees to the UI fund for at least twelve months and must have been working 
for at least seventy-five days distributed over at least four months during the 
twelve months preceding the current unemployment spell. Participation in re- 
lief work as well  as in labor market retraining programs  counts as work in 
this respect. 
Workers who do not meet the membership condition are entitled to KAS 
benefits if they meet either a work requirement of roughly the same type as for 
UI fund compensation or an “education condition.” The education condition is 
met if individuals have finished at least one year of school in excess of the nine 
compulsory years and searched for a job at a public employment office for at 
least ninety days. 
As the duration of compensation is limited in principle, the system also cre- 
ates incentives to find a job before compensation runs out.3  This aspect has 
been stressed by Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991) as a key factor behind 
the high observed Swedish real wage sensitivity to changes in unemployment. 
This, in turn, is a potential explanation for Sweden’s favorable unemployment 
experiences during the 1980s. It is important to note, however, that the system 
has recently changed. Since the late 1980s, participation in labor market pro- 
grams qualifies for new periods of unemployment compensation, so in practice 
there is no limit on the amount of time a jobless person can spend outside the 
regular labor market by  switching between training and unemployment com- 
pen~ation.~  There is some indirect evidence  suggesting that this is the case: 
Axelsson and Lofgren (1992), studying the effects of retraining programs on 
income, found a significant positive effect on those who finished training pro- 
2. Changes in  the UI system initiated in  1994 make membership compulsory and add funds 
3. When unemployment compensation  runs out, individuals are  eligible for social security, 
4. The change in the system pertains to training programs; relief work has always been consid- 
administered by the state. 
which offers significantly less generous compensation. 
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grams in 1981, whereas RegnCr (1993) finds significant negative income ef- 
fects for 1989 and 1990 program participants. A possible explanation for this 
difference is that, in the latter period,  training  qualified for unemployment 
compensation, so the negative income effect therefore reflects negative selec- 
tion of program participants. Unfortunately, there is a lack of direct evidence 
(e.g., in the form of event histories) on the extent of a “circular flow” between 
unemployment and programs. 
6.1.2  Measures to Create Employment 
The principal measure to create employment has for a long time been public 
relief work. The primary stated aim is to counteract temporary downturns in 
labor demand, but relief jobs have also been targeted for groups with perma- 
nently high unemployment risks. Unemployed UI fund members who run out 
of unemployment compensation are in principle granted the right to a relief 
job. To qualify for a relief job, one must be registered as an unemployed job 
applicant at a public employment office for a minimum number of days (about 
a week). The duration of  relief jobs is normally capped at six months, and 
payment is according to collective agreement in the regular labor market. Re- 
lief workers are obliged to accept suitable job offers and can be expelled from 
relief jobs on refusal. Relief work can be arranged by central or local govern- 
ments or (rarely) by the private sector. The typical relief job has traditionally 
been  in  building  and  road  construction,  but  the  emphasis  has  gradually 
changed to jobs in  health and welfare. From the “workfare” point of  view, 
relief work offers a “work test”: if the employment office fails to find a suitable 
job for the applicant, it can test his or her willingness to work by  offering a 
relief job. 
Recruitment subsidies, introduced in 1984, aim at facilitating employment 
for the long-term unemployed and at creating permanent jobs in the local pub- 
lic  sector  for  the  long-term  or  partially  unemployed.  Subsidies  normally 
amount to at most 60 percent of the total wage cost and can be given for a 
maximum of 6 months. 
Beginning in 1984, a variety of  special “youth measures” have been used, 
and their use has intensified recently. The most recent form (introduced in July 
1992) is called youth practice and is targeted at youths between eighteen and 
twenty-four years of age. Participants receive compensation roughly equal to 
unemployment benefits, and employers receive free labor. In addition to keep- 
ing participants out of unemployment, youth practice offers a work test of the 
same kind as relief work. The combination of youth practice and a deep reces- 
sion is believed to have weakened significantly the incentives to hire youths. 
Finally, since January  1993, the unemployed can prolong their period of 
unemployment compensation by taking part in so-called labor market develop- 
ments. These last for at most six months, and the participant receives income 
equivalent to unemployment compensation benefits. The employer, normally 273  An Evaluation of the Swedish Active Labor Market Policy 
organizations, associations, or the public  sector, gets free labor. To  prevent 
crowding out, participants are supposed to perform duties that would otherwise 
not have been performed. As the number of participants has increased rapidly, 
this last condition might prove to pose problems: either participants do what 
they are supposed to do, in which case large numbers of people perform super- 
fluous tasks, or, alternatively, crowding out will prove to be an important issue. 
6.1.3  Mobility-Enhancing Measures 
The traditional mobility-enhancing measure is the employment service ad- 
ministration. The Swedish employment service is not limited to just a broker- 
age function-another  important function is to administer both unemployment 
insurance and selection to labor market programs. A distinguishing feature of 
the Swedish setup regarding job brokerage is that the public employment ser- 
vice has had a legal monopoly position.  Since the late 1970s, there has also 
been  compulsory  notification  of  vacancies  through  the  public  employment 
service.5 
Another  mobility  enhancing  measure  is  “mobility  grantshtarting allow- 
ances.” These grants are intended to facilitate geographic mobility by making 
moving  an economically feasible  alternative to unemployment in the home 
region. To qualify, one must be an unemployed  person looking for a job in 
another region through the public unemployment service. Other, more strict 
criteria, such as belonging to certain “scarce” professions, have also been ap- 
plicable from time to time. 
Last, but not least, among the mobility-enhancing measures is labor market 
retraining. The official aims are to help the unemployed or those facing unem- 
ployment risks get a job, help those with little education or obsolete education 
attain a stronger position in the labor market, and help firms find workers with 
adequate education. Labor market retraining comes in many different forms 
and is produced by  a plethora of educational  institutions on requisition  by 
county-level authorities under the National Labor Market Board. Retraining 
eligibility is conditional on being unemployed or facing the risk of unemploy- 
ment and job search through public employment service. Compensation under 
retraining programs is roughly equivalent to unemployment compensation. 
6.1.4  Measures Targeted for the Disabled 
There are four basic measures targeted at the disabled: employment in com- 
munity enterprises, public sheltered work, wage-subsidized  employment, and 
vocational rehabilitation. A common feature of these measures is that their goal 
is to provide work for those who, owing to various disabilities, have difficulty 
obtaining employment in the regular labor market. 
5. One side benefit of the employment service’s monopoly is that Swedish vacancy data are 
likely to be of high quality. 274  Anders Forslund and Alan B. Krueger 
Table 6.1  Comparison of Labor Market Policies in Sweden, the United States, 
and Germany 
Sweden 
United States,  Germany, 
Labor Market Policy  1982  1990  1990  1990 
Average unemployment 
compensation per 
recipient"  10,843  17,655  2,111  12,782 
recipientb  9,214  6,568  2,035  N.A. 
labor forcec  ,0085  ,0094  .0103  ,0102 
unemployed'  .32  .62  .19  .16 
proportion of unemployed  .39  .I2  .oo  .04 
Average training costs per 
Trainees as a proportion of 
Trainees as a proportion of 
Public relief workers as a 
Proportion of GNP devoted to 
labor market policiesd  ,039  ,028  ,004  ,021 
Sources: Unemployment benefit data for United States are from 1991 Green Book, p. 466. Train- 
ing data for the United States are from 1991 Green Book, pp. 1454-56,  and pertain to JTPA IIA, 
and JTF'A  IIB, and Job Corps programs. Swedish data are from Statistisk Arsbok 1992 and OECD 
Economic  Surveys.  German  data  are  from  Statistisches  Bundesamt  (1993)  and  Zuhlen  zur 
Wirtschafrichtlichen  Entwicklung der Bundersrepublik Deutschland 1992, lnstitut der Deutschen 
Wirtschaft. 
Note: All monetary figures (rows 1 and 2) are in 1990 U.S.  dollars. Swedish kronor were converted 
to dollars using the exchange rate and were converted from 1982 to 1990 dollars with the CPI-U. 
N.A. = not available. 
aOnly certified UI fund benefits are included for Sweden. 
bNet training costs are reported for Sweden (i.e., average unemployment benefits have been sub- 
tracted off). For the United States, training programs include the Job Training Partnership Act 
(JTPA) and the Job Corps. 
'Only  trainees who receive government compensation are included for Germany, 
dPolicies  included in U.S. figure are job training, summer youth employment, unemployment bene- 
fits, and employment services. Policies included in Sweden figure include job training, relief 
worker, youth measures, unemployment benefits, and handicapped programs. Policies included for 
Germany include unemployment benefits, retraining, employment services, preretirement benefits, 
subsidized employment programs, compensation for short-time workers, compensation of  con- 
struction workers during inclement weather, and administrative costs. 
6.1.5  Quantitative Description 
Table 6.1 summarizes the magnitude of key labor market programs in Swe- 
den, the United States, and Germany in various years. It is clear that Sweden 
spends much more on training and unemployment benefits per recipient than 
the United States. Sweden's unemployment benefits are particularly  generous 
by comparison to the United States.6 Since workers who are in training pro- 
grams also qualify for unemployment benefits, the total amount spent on work- 
6. Sweden reduced its replacement ratio by  10 percentage points in  1993, but benefits are still 
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ers undergoing training is roughly of the same order of magnitude as the cost 
of tuition, room, and board for a year at Harvard!’ 
Readers may be surprised to see, however, that 1 percent of the labor force 
is enrolled in public training programs in the United States, which is slightly 
higher than  the comparable figure for Sweden or Germany. This fact casts 
some doubt on the relative importance of  “disguised unemployment” in labor 
market programs in Sweden. Even if one counted all Sweden’s workers who 
are on training or public relief programs as unemployed, the unemployment 
rate in the 1980s would have increased only by roughly  1 percentage point. 
Thus, disguised unemployment cannot account for much of Sweden’s histori- 
cally low unemployment rate. 
Although the proportion of  the labor force receiving training is about the 
same, a much higher proportion of the unemployed undergo training in a given 
year in Sweden than in the United States. In 1990, government training partici- 
pants represented 62 percent of the number of unemployed workers. Moreover, 
a sizable proportion of the unemployed are also placed in public relief jobs in 
Sweden, a program for which there is no current analog in the United States. 
Sweden devotes about 3 percent of  GNP to labor market programs, which ex- 
ceeds the amount spent in Germany (2.1 percent) and the United States (0.4 
percent). The increase in unemployment in Sweden in the past two years can 
be expected to cause a substantial increase in expenditures on labor market 
programs relative to GNP. 
The changing importance of some of the main Swedish labor market pro- 
grams is illustrated in figure 6.2.  The figure presents the proportion of the labor 
force that is directly involved in retraining, relief  work, youth programs, or 
recruitment subsidies. A number of features stand out. First, relief work shows 
a clear countercyclic pattern. Second, the incidence of relief work has trended 
steadily downward in the 1980s. Third, labor market retraining has not had the 
same cyclic variability  as relief  work,  again except for the past few years. 
Fourth, the incidence of retraining gradually trended upward in the 1980s.  As 
a result of these contrasting trends, the relative importance of retraining has 
grown in the 1980s and 1990s, while the relative importance of public relief 
work has declined. Sixth, there has been a dramatic increase in the prevalence 
of youth measures in recent years. Finally, the incidence of retraining measures 
declined in 1993. This decline was partly a result of budgetary cutbacks and 
partly a result of greater participation in “labor market ventures.” 
6.2  Theoretical Framework 
The Swedish labor market programs  are diverse and extensive.  It is im- 
portant to consider each program in this overall context. For example, one must 
7. As Richard Freeman has pointed out to us, this is also roughly equivalent to the cost of a year 













f  u 
.t 




4  * 






o  retraining 
A  youth  measures 
relief work 
0  recruitment  subsidies 
19i0  19>5  1980  1985  1990  1993 
Year 
Fig. 6.2  Participation in labor market programs as a fraction of the labor 
force, 197O:l-1993:2  (semiannually) 
recognize that solidarity wage policy is likely to set a floor on wages; workers 
whose productivity  levels fall below  this floor will find it difficult to obtain 
employment (see Edin and Topel, chap. 4 in this volume). Thus, the benefit of 
raising worker productivity through government training, say, is greater given 
the preexisting wage rigidity. Similarly, wage subsidies to employers of low- 
wage employees will relax the constraint imposed by the solidarity policy and 
thus could increase employment and enhance efficiency. 
Moreover, the social cost of  unemployment (or low productivity)  is espe- 
cially high in Sweden because unemployed workers qualify for generous trans- 
fer benefits, retraining, and public relief work. The high income tax also raises 
the social cost of unemployment or low productivity  because tax revenue is 
forgone, which requires even higher tax rates (which in turn probably cause 
further labor supply distortions). And the fact that income taxes are progressive 
reduces the incentive to invest in human capital and search for better-paying 
jobs. The adverse effects of  these distortions could be  reduced by effective 
government intervention to encourage training, mobility, and employment.8 
If one takes the network of government programs as given, then the proper 
8.  Notice,  however,  that  government  intervention  does  not  necessarily  have  to  involve 
government-provided training. For example, the government could provide vouchers to individuals 
for private training, or it could lower tuition costs through grants or loans. 277  An Evaluation of the Swedish Active Labor Market Policy 
theoretical framework is to start from a situation with preexisting distortions. 
As is well known, in this second-best setting, government intervention could 
improve economic efficiency. In this framework, the benefits of successful la- 
bor market  programs in Sweden are potentially  greater than in the United 
States, which may explain why the Swedish labor market programs are more 
extensive. But, if the external environment changes (if there is, e.g., a reduction 
in marginal tax rates or unemployment benefits-as  has been the case in Swe- 
den), then this theoretical framework suggests that the social benefit of active 
labor market programs may be reduced. 
One must also consider possible indirect effects of labor market programs 
on wage and employment outcomes. Theoretical bargaining models predict 
that labor market programs will exert upward pressure on wages. Aggregate 
time-series studies provide some empirical support for this prediction (Calm- 
fors and Forslund  1991; Calmfors 1993; and Calmfors and Lang 1995), al- 
though Edin, Holmlund, and Ostros’s (1993) county-level analysis finds that 
labor market programs do not put upward pressure on wage bargains. It is thus 
possible  that  labor market  programs  cause  higher wages  and  depress  em- 
ployment. 
The total social costs and benefits of labor market programs must be com- 
pared to determine their optimal level. Rational design of policy would take 
into account the efficacy of labor market programs. If, on the margin, a krona 
spent on retraining has a higher reward than a krona spent on public relief 
work, then the retraining program should receive a larger share of the available 
resources. Such cost-benefit comparisons are especially important given the 
rising expense of  labor market programs  and the rising government budget 
deficit. Next, we present an evaluation of  the effectiveness of retraining pro- 
grams and public relief works, drawing on the past literature and some new 
analysis. 
6.3  Displacement Effects of Public Relief Workers 
There was a large shift away from public relief work and toward job training 
in  the  1980s. Nevertheless,  over  10 percent  of  unemployed  workers  were 
placed on public relief jobs in 1990, and there is some discussion of expanding 
public relief in response to the current economic crisis. One potential drawback 
of public relief work is that public relief workers may displace private sector 
workers. There is an extensive literature on this topic in the United  States, 
beginning  with  Johnson  and  Tomola  (1977).  The theoretical  argument  is 
straightforward: if the public sector provides relief workers to a local govern- 
ment agency or private sector firm,  the local government or private firm will 
hire fewer workers than it otherwise would have hired. 
Johnson and Tomola conclude that public sector employment programs used 
in the United States in 1966-75 tended to displace other workers, on net creat- 
ing few additional jobs after six quarters. This conclusion is not without con- 278  Anders Forslund and Alan B. Krueger 
troversy. Borus and Hamermesh (1978) argued that Johnson and Tomola’s esti- 
mates are sensitive to their Almon lag specification and nonrobust because of 
strong multicollinearity in their aggregate time-series data. Adams, Cook, and 
Maurice (1983) estimate displacement effects using a panel data set of annual 
observations on cities in 1970-79.  They find that public sector employment 
grants had a significant negative effect on payrolls in 1978 and 1979 but not in 
1977. In 1978, for example, seventy-seven cents of every dollar in public sector 
employment grants were reflected in higher city payrolls. Adams, Cook, and 
Maurice attribute the finding of less of a displacement after 1977 to a redesign 
of the program, which tightened eligibility and required specific projects. 
There has been only one previous study of the displacement effects of public 
relief workers in Sweden. That study, by Gramlich and Ysander (1981), ana- 
lyzes fourteen annual time-series observations from 1964  to 1977. The authors 
focus on the two largest categories of public relief expenditures and employ- 
ment: health and welfare workers and road construction workers. They esti- 
mate aggregate time-series models, similar to Johnson and Tomola. Gramlich 
and Y  sander find evidence of considerable displacement in road construction 
but not in the health and welfare sector. 
We investigate the displacement effects of public relief workers using annual 
data for twenty-four counties in Sweden over the period  1976-91  for all con- 
struction workers and over the period 1982-90 for health and welfare  worker^.^ 
Specifically, we estimate employment equations of the form 
where E,, is employment in county i in year t, PRW,,-, is the total number of 
public relief workers in county i in year t -  1, vl  is the log of the average real 
wage in county i in year t, and Xj,  is a vector of cyclic demand measures, such 
as  the  unemployment  rate  and  vacancy rate. We  also include  unrestricted 
county fixed effects (F!) and unrestricted year effects (7,).  Equation (1) is esti- 
mated separately for construction workers and for health and welfare workers. 
Relief workers should not be counted among the workers included in the de- 
pendent variable. Thus, fiscal substitution (i.e., displacement) will imply a neg- 
ative coefficient on PRW, and complete fiscal substitution will imply a coeffi- 
cient of -  1  .O.  We have also experimented with specifications using various 
lags of public relief workers and with subsets of the covariates. 
Results for construction workers are presented in table 6.2. Each specifica- 
tion shows a negative and statistically significant coefficient on public relief 
workers, implying  substantial displacement.  Column 6, which includes the 
largest set of covariates, indicates that 0.69 fewer private construction workers 
are employed for every additional public relief worker hired. The lowest esti- 
mate of displacement that we find is -0.36,  in specifications where we omit 
the year effects. 
9. The health and welfare workers series is shorter because of comparability problems with the 
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Table 6.2  Displacement Effects of Public Relief Workers (dependent variable: 
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Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Equations also include intercept terms. Mean of depen- 
dent variable is 9,385. Observations in cols. 1-2  are for 1976-91; observations in cols. 3-6  are for 
1976-90.  There are twenty-four counties in the sample each year. 
The results for health and welfare workers, reported in table 6.3, are much 
less clear. The estimated  displacement  effect for health  and welfare  work- 
ers is  not  stable  when  different  sets of  covariates  are included-it  boun- 
ces from -2.26  to +0.91. Moreover, the standard errors are quite large, and 
the  estimated  effect  is  statistically  insignificant  in  column  6, which 
includes  the  full  set  of  covariates.  Unfortunately,  it  is  difficult  to  draw 
much  of  a  conclusion  about  the  extent  of  displacement  for  this  group of 
workers. 
One potential problem with our estimates of displacement is that causality 
may run in the reverse direction. A prolonged downturn in the economy may 
stimulate the use of relief workers, thus generating a negative correlation be- 
tween (lagged) relief workers and nonrelief employment. We include cyclical 
demand measures (unemployment and vacancy rates) in the regressions to con- 
trol for this possibility. Nevertheless,  in a highly cyclical industry like con- 
struction, reverse causality may still be a concern. To explore this issue further, 
we also estimated vector autoregressions for employment and relief workers 
in each sector. These estimates are reported in table 6.4. The results indicate 
that lagged relief workers and lagged employment have a statistically signifi- 
cant effect in the employment equations but that lagged employment does not 
have a statistically significant effect in the relief worker equations. This finding 
suggests that causality does not run from employment to relief workers, but, 
with our relatively short time period, it is hard to draw firm conclusions from 
the vector autoregressions. 280  Anders Forslund and Alan B. Krueger 
Table 6.3  Displacement Effects of Public Relief Workers (dependent variable: 










































































Nore: Standard errors are in parentheses. Equations also include intercept terms. Mean of depen- 
dent variable is 33,140. Observations in cols.  1-2  are for 1982-91;  observations in cols. 3-6  are 
for 1982-90. There are twenty-four counties in the sample each year. 
As a final check on the plausibility of our estimates, we estimated a vector 
autoregression  for the durable manufacturing  sector, an industry  that is not 
directly  affected  by  public  relief  workers.  Since the  durable manufactur- 
ing sector is highly cyclic, this industry provides a test of  whether our pre- 
vious  results  of  the  construction  industry  are  spuriously  reflecting cyclical 
patterns.  The p  value  for a joint test of three  lags of  the public relief  vari- 
able in the employment  equation for durable manufacturing  workers is .11 
(F = 2.03). The corresponding test for construction  workers has a p  value 
of .OOOO (F = 9.07). These results suggest that the effect of relief workers on 
construction  employment  is  not  just  spuriously  reflecting  the  business 
cycle. 
To summarize, we find evidence of substantial displacement in the construc- 
tion sector but not in the health and welfare  sector. This conclusion is very 
much like Gramlich and Ysander’s, even though we analyze data for a more 
recent time  period,  exploit  county-level  data,  and use  different  estimation 
methods. 
6.4  Job Training 
In view of the large amount of  resources devoted to job retraining in Swe- 
den, one would expect to find a vast microeconometric literature on the effec- 
tiveness of training programs. This is not the case. There have been only about 281  An Evaluation of the Swedish Active Labor Market Policy 
Table 6.4  Vector Autoregressions for Employment and Relief Worker, 
by Sector 
Construction  Health and Welfare 
Variable  Employment  Relief Workers  Employment  Relief Workers 
Relief workers (f -  1) 
Relief workers (f -  2) 
Relief workers (t -  3) 
Employment (t -  1) 
Employment (t -  2) 
Employment (t -  3) 
F statistic for relief 
workersa 







-  .007 
(.007) 
-  .009 
(.008) 








Note; Equations also include county dummies, year dummies, log average wage, vacancy rate, and 
unemployment rate. Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
*p  value for lagged relief workers is in brackets. 
bp value for lagged employment is in brackets. 
a half dozen studies of the effect of job training on earnings with Swedish data. 
These studies use a variety of  econometric models and data sets, and some 
studies use several estimation techniques. In Sweden, as in the United States, 
there is considerable uncertainty regarding the proper estimation method and 
specification for estimating the “treatment effect” of job training. But, in Swe- 
den, problems of imprecise estimates are at least as important as model speci- 
fication. In summarizing the literature, we report fixed effects estimates when 
multiple estimates were available.1° 
Figure 6.3 summarizes the past literature on the effect of job training on 
earnings. The figure shows the estimated payoff to training as a proportion of 
earnings, with a bound of  plus or minus two standard errors around the esti- 
mate. As a benchmark for these estimates, one should bear in mind that, if job 
training raises participants’ annual earnings by 3 percent for twenty years, then 
the present value of the payoff to the training roughly equals its costs.” Thus, 
one should hope that studies have enough precision to detect payoffs on the 
10. For a thoughtful summary of this literature, see Bjorklund (1990). 
11. In making this calculation, we assume that the typical participant earns $15,000 per year, 
that job training increases annual earnings permanently by  3 percent, and that the individual works 282  Anders Forslund and Alan B. Krueger 
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Fig. 6.3  Returns to retraining programs in Sweden-selected  estimates with 
pluslminus 2 standard error band 
Note: Studies: 1, Edin (1989); 2, Bjorklund (1989); 3, Ackum (1991); 4,  Axelsson and Lofgren 
(1992); 5, Regntr (1993); 6, Inversevariance weighted average; 7, Arithmetic average. 
order of 3 percent. Unfortunately, there is a wide range of estimates, and each 
of  the estimates has a large standard error. Two of  the estimates are signifi- 
cantly below .03, and one is significantly above .03. 
To improve the precision of the estimates, we calculated the weighted aver- 
age of  the estimates, using as weights the inverse sampling variance of  the 
estimate. (We also calculated the standard error of the weighted-average esti- 
mate.) This is reported as study 6 in figure 6.3. The weighted-average payoff 
is slightly negative (-0.8  percent) but not statistically different from zero 
(SE = 1.2 percent). One could, however, reject the null hypothesis of a payoff 
on the order of 3 percent using the weighted average of the estimates. On the 
other hand, the arithmetic average of  the estimated effects in the studies is 
positive, but it is not statistically different from zero or from 3 percent. 
These studies show that there is not enough support to reject the null hypoth- 
esis that training has no effect on participants’ subsequent earnings. If we use 
the weighted average of the estimates, we would reject the null hypothesis that 
the payoff  is on the order of 3 percent, which is roughly the break-even level 
for the training programs. 
Individually, the studies of earnings lack sufficient power to reach a convinc- 
ing conclusion on this critical issue. A high priority for researchers in Sweden 
for twenty years. If we apply a real interest rate of 3 percent to future earnings, the present value 
of the payoff to training is $6,695, which exceeds the average cost of  $6,568 in 1990.  This calcula- 
tion ignores the time costs of participants while they undergo training. 283  An Evaluation of the Swedish Active Labor Market Policy 
should be the construction of  data sets that permit precise estimates of the 
effect of job-training programs. The following calculation indicates approxi- 
mately how large a sample is required to draw reasonably precise inferences.I2 
Suppose a standard error of  about  1 percent is desired. If  we take Regnir’s 
(1993) sample and estimates as representative, we would need a sample of 
roughly forty-one thousand observations to achieve a standard error of  .01, 
compared to the actual sample of five thousand observations. We feel that Bjor- 
klund’s (1990, 12) recommendation is worth repeating: “More attention must 
be paid to these-less  glamorous-issues  of data quality in order to get esti- 
mates of reasonable precision.” In the light of Heckman and Smith’s (1993) 
finding that JTPA (Job Training Partnership Act) experimental and nonexperi- 
mental evaluations yield similar results when the comparison sample for non- 
experimental sample is carefully selected, we feel that this suggestion is partic- 
ularly prescient. 
There is an even smaller set of studies to review that examine the effect of 
training on subsequent employment probabilities. A careful study by  Bjor- 
klund (1989) finds that retraining programs raise the probability that partici- 
pants are subsequently employed by 4.4-5.5  percent if a linear control function 
is estimated  and by  2-8  percent  if  a fixed-effects model  is estimated,  de- 
pending on the period. Only the 8 percent estimate is significantly different 
from zero, however. Duration models estimated by Korpi (1992) indicate that 
longer experience in labor market programs is associated with greater employ- 
ment stability for youths in Stockholm and that youths who found jobs directly 
after participating in manpower programs tended to stay on the job longer. 
Until sufficient data are available to make precise estimates for Sweden, we 
believe that estimates for the United States could prove informative for Swe- 
den. The U.S. literature consistently finds that job-training programs have their 
largest percentage payoff for women. Men tend to have smaller payoffs, and 
the available estimates for youths suggest that training has little effect on their 
subsequent labor market outcomes (see LaLonde 1992). Although  selection 
into training programs and the content of programs in Sweden are likely to be 
quite different, the American estimates may provide a rough indication of the 
likely returns in Sweden. In the absence of compelling evidence to the con- 
trary, we suspect that a similar qualitative pattern will hold in Sweden. More- 
over, the small payoff to training based on the weighted-average study in figure 
6.3 is consistent with the modest payoffs found in the American literature. All 
this suggests to us that one should not expect heroic returns from job-training 
programs. The benefits may justify the costs (especially in Sweden because of 
preexisting  distortions noted earlier), but the returns  are likely to be in the 
neighborhood of 3 percent higher income per year. 
12. Another issue to consider is the proper statistical methods and specifications to estimate the 
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6.5  Beveridge Curve 
The stability of the unemployment-vacancy relation, or Beveridge curve, is 
one of  the features of  the Swedish labor market that many  observers have 
pointed to. One possible explanation for the stable Beveridge curve in Sweden 
is that active labor market policies have improved the matching of workers to 
vacancies. But there are alternative explanations as well. First, the public relief 
jobs and training programs may  mask unemployed workers. Second, public 
sector employment has grown rapidly in Sweden, with the percentage of Swed- 
ish workers directly employed by  the government increased from 20 percent 
in 1965 to 38.2 percent in 1985. The increase in public sector employment is 
even more dramatic for women, rising from 29.5 percent in 1965 to 54.8 per- 
cent in 1985. Government employment may have soaked up workers who oth- 
erwise would be unemployed, preventing an outward shift in the Beveridge 
curve.13 We  explore these alternative explanations for the stable Beveridge 
curve. 
We consider two sources of unemployment data: labor force survey data and 
register data. Figure 6.4~  documents the stability of the Beveridge curve using 
biannual unemployment data from the labor force survey. Figure 6.4b contains 
the corresponding plot using register data. The unemployed counted in the reg- 
ister data consist of people looking for work and immediately available to take 
a job. In both figure 6.4~  and 6.4b, the vacancy rate is measured by the number 
of vacancies listed in the register divided by the labor force. 
The unemployment-vacancy rate relation is fairly stable over time when the 
unemployment rate is derived from the labor force survey. The register data, by 
contrast, indicate that the unemployment-vacancy relation shifted in somewhat 
between  1990 and  1992 (see fig. 6.4b). Both these patterns present a sharp 
contrast with most other industrialized countries, which experienced a shift out 
of  the unemployment-vacancy locus in the 1970s and 1980s. We  utilize the 
register data in our county-level analysis because the relatively small sample 
size in the labor force survey would induce considerable sampling variability 
in county-level estimates. Our goal then is to explain why the Beveridge curve 
has shifted in for Sweden. 
Table 6.5 presents estimates of the Beveridge curve using county-level data 
for Sweden for 1981-91.  In the first four columns, the unemployment rate de- 
rived from the registers is the dependent variable. Columns 5 and 6 contain 
estimates that use a broader measure of the unemployment rate as the depen- 
dent variable; the broader measure also counts workers on public relief jobs, 
training programs, and youth programs as among the unemployed. Results with 
either dependent variable cast some doubt on the importance of public sector 
employment for the stability of the Beveridge curve in Sweden. 
The regression reported in column  1 reveals a negatively sloped relation 
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Fig. 6.4  Beveridge curve. a, Survey data. b, Register data. 286  Anders Forslund and Alan B. Krueger 
Table 6.5  Exploration of Stability of Beveridge Curve in Sweden, County-Level 
Data, 1981-91 
Dependent Variable 
Unemployment Rate  UR  + Programs 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Vacancy rate  -2.34 
Year (+ 100)  ... 
Proportion public 
23 county dummies  Yes 
R2  .69 
Sample size  264 
sector 
-1.70  -1.83 
(.16)  (.I81 
-.I6  ... 
(.01) 
...  -.13 
(.02) 
Yes  Yes 
.80  .I4 
264  264 








-2.07  -2.22 
(.25)  (.25) 
-  .22  -.31 
...  ,123 
Yes  Yes 
30  31 
(.02)  ~03) 
(.039) 
264  264 
Nofe: Regressions also include constants. Proportion public sector is the proportion of the labor 
force employed in the public sector. Vacancy rate is the number of registered vacancies relative to 
the labor force. Unemployment rate is the unemployment rate derived from the registers. “UR + 
Programs” is (unemployed + relief workers + number on training programs + number on youth 
programs)/labor force. Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
between the unemployment rate and the vacancy rate. Notice that the coeffi- 
cient on the linear time trend reported in column 2 indicates that the county- 
level Beveridge curve has shifted in, as expected from figure 6.4b above. In the 
model in column 3,  we substitute a variable measuring the proportion of work- 
ers in the county who are employed in the public sector for the time trend. The 
estimates in column 3 are consistent with the view that public sector employ- 
ment has absorbed unemployed workers, as the public sector share has a nega- 
tive and statistically significant effect on the county unemployment rate. How- 
ever, once we add a linear year trend to the model in column 4, the public 
sector employment variable changes sign. Moreover, the year trend is hardly 
affected by the inclusion of the public sector employment variable. In columns 
4 and 5, we use the broader definition of the unemployment rate. These results 
also indicate that the Beveridge curve has shifted in and that the proportion of 
workers employed in the public sector has a positive effect on unemployment 
when a linear time trend is included. 
From the estimates in table 6.5, one may be tempted to conclude that a grow- 
ing public sector absorbed many unemployed workers, only that the growth in 
public sector employment was roughly constant, making it difficult to distin- 
guish from a linear time trend. In other words, including both public sector 
employment and the time trend causes a multicollinearity problem. Although 
this interpretation is possibly correct, the time path of public sector employ- 
ment differed across counties, enabling us to estimate the model with both 
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for the proportion in the public sector increases only slightly once the time 
trend is added to the model, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a serious 
problem. 
We are also aware that a valid criticism of the regressions in table 6.5 is that 
public sector employment is possibly  an endogenous variable. Nevertheless, 
we consider these results  suggestive that growing public sector employment 
does not account for the inward shift of the Swedish Beveridge curve. In addi- 
tion, when  we use a broader measure of unemployment-one  that includes 
program participation  as well as open unemployment-we  still find that the 
Beveridge curve has shifted in. Thus, we have no satisfactory explanation for 
the time trend in the Beveridge curve in Sweden. 
Although the reasons for Sweden’s unemployment-vacancy relation are un- 
clear, we should stress that a stable or inward shift of the Beveridge curve is 
not necessarily a virtue if the unemployment rate has increased. If the Bever- 
idge curve had shifted out, at least there would be substantial job vacancies at 
the  prevailing  high  unemployment  rate,  and  the  issue  would  be matching 
people to jobs. But, in Sweden’s current economic environment, the level of 
vacancies is low, and the level of unemployment is high. Unless we were con- 
fident of steps that would move the Swedish labor market down along a stable 
Beveridge curve, this is not a desirable situation. 
6.6  International Evidence on Active Labor Market Programs 
Our main approach in this paper has been to try to measure the effect that 
specific labor market programs (such as public relief work) have on key out- 
come variables (such as construction worker employment). For the programs 
and outcome measures that we have been able to study, this analysis provides 
little support for the view  that Sweden’s labor market policies have greatly 
enhanced the operation of the labor market. Most of the favorable impression 
of active labor market policies, however, is due to a different approach-cross- 
country analyses. In these studies, an aggregate measure of a country’s labor 
market performance (usually the unemployment rate) is related to institutional 
characteristics of  the  country, such as variables  measuring the extent of its 
active labor market programs and other economic variables  (e.g., Bean, La- 
yard, and Nickell 1986; and Layard, Nickell, and Jackman 1991). The interna- 
tional evidence has generally found that countries with greater spending on 
active labor market policies tend to have lower unemployment. In this section, 
we review, update, and evaluate the international evidence on the effectiveness 
of labor market programs. 
In their influential book, Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (199 1, chap. 1) pres- 
ent a cross-country regression of the average unemployment rate for 1983-88 
on a variable measuring active labor market programs and several other vari- 
ables. Their sample consists of twenty OECD countries. Active labor market 
programs are measured by expenditures on these programs per unemployed 288  Anders Forslund and Alan B. Krueger 
person relative to GDP per capita in  1987. Their regression coefficients (t- 
ratios in parentheses) are reported below: 
unemployment rate (%) = 0.24 (0.1) 
+ 0.92 (2.9) benefit duration (years) 
+ 0.17 (7.1) replacement ratio (%) 
-  0.13 (2.3) active labor market spending (%) 
+ 2.45 (2.4) coverage of collective bargaining (1-3) 
- 1.42 (2.0) union coordination (1-3) 
-  4.28 (2.9) employer coordination (1-3) 
-  0.35 (2.8) change in inflation (% points), 
R2-adj.  = 0.91,  SE = 1.41,  N = 20. 
The statistically significant point estimate on the active labor market vari- 
able implies that the derivative of the unemployment rate with respect to the 
share of the labor force in programs equals -  1.5, so the reduction in open 
unemployment therefore exceeds the direct effect of lifting people out of un- 
employment by  means of  active labor market policies  (see Calmfors  1994, 
n. 18). 
In related work, Zetterberg (1993) pools time-series data for nineteen OECD 
countries for the period 1985-91  and regresses unemployment on the ratio of 
expenditures on active labor market measures relative to total expenditures on 
labor market policies. Consistent with Layard, Nickell, and Jackman, he finds 
that, as the share of expenditures on labor market policies increases, the na- 
tional unemployment rate declines. 
We think that there are two major weaknesses with the cross-country analy- 
ses that limit their usefulness in evaluating active labor market programs. The 
first problem arises because the source of  variability in the countries’ labor 
market policies is unclear. In this situation, one would like to control for a 
great many variables that might influence the unemployment rate and national 
labor market policy. However, with only twenty observations, the number of 
variables that one can hold constant is greatly restricted. 
A related issue is that cause and effect in the cross-country regressions are 
very difficult to ascertain. If  a nation is in a prolonged downturn, it may be 
difficult to deny generous unemployment  insurance benefits to unemployed 
workers. In  this scenario,  high unemployment  causes high  UI replacement 
rates and long benefit durations, not vice versa. A possible approach to solving 
this simultaneity bias problem would be to instrument for the labor market 
variables, but valid instrumental variables are difficult to find for this problem. 
A similar concern arises with the active labor market variables. As  Grubb 
(1993) and OECD (1993) point out, spending on active labor market measures 
tends to rise less than in proportion with unemployment in most OECD coun- 
tries. As spending on unemployment benefits typically varies approximately in 
proportion to unemployment, this has induced a negative correlation between 
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worker and between unemployment and the share of total labor market pro- 
gram expenses devoted to active labor market  program^.'^ 
Our second, and perhaps more important, concern is that the cross-country 
evidence on the active labor market programs is not very stable over time. The 
cross-country evidence has been conducted mainly using data for the 1980s, 
when the unemployment rate in Sweden and other countries with extensive 
active labor market programs was relatively low. The situation has changed 
quite dramatically in the early 1990s. To probe the stability of the international 
evidence, we have conducted a cross-country analysis of the 1993 unemploy- 
ment rate that is similar in spirit to the work of Layard, Nickell, and Jackman 
(1991) and Zetterberg (1 993). 
Specifically, we regress the unemployment rate in 1993 on two measures of 
active labor market programs, the change in inflation and the same institutional 
variables used by Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991). For comparison, we 
present corresponding estimates for the years 1983-88, the period analyzed by 
Layard, Nickell, and Jackman. We measure the importance of active labor mar- 
ket programs in two ways. First, we calculate the fraction of GDP spent on 
active labor market programs. Second, we use Zetterberg’s (1993) variable, 
which equals the share of expenditures on active labor market measures rela- 
tive to total expenditure on labor market programs. Both these measures have 
problems. Most obviously, active labor market expenditures relative to GDP 
may rise when unemployment rises because more people become eligible for 
programs-the  simultaneity problem we noted previously. The simultaneity 
bias is likely to impart the opposite bias for the share of expenditures on active 
labor market programs relative to total expenditures on labor market programs. 
But bear in mind that our main interest here is in examining whether the effect 
of the active labor market variables has changed between the 1980s and 1993, 
not whether the estimates are biased at any one tirne.l5 
Table 6.6 summarizes the main regression results.I6 The table indicates a 
striking change in the coefficients for the active labor market variables. In the 
period 1983-88, both active labor market variables have a negative association 
with unemployment, whereas they both have a positive association in 1993. 
The t-ratio for a test of the difference between the estimates for the active labor 
variable in columns 3 and 4 is  1.89. It is also worth noting that the union 
coverage and union coordination  variables have changed signs and become 
statistically insignificant in 1993. On the other hand, the duration and generos- 
14. This point is demonstrated in OECD (1993, annex 2.A), which shows that the significant 
effect of  active labor market programs found by  Layard, Nickell, and Jackman vanishes when 
spending on active labor market programs is instead related to the total wage bill. 
15.  The correlation between Layard, Nickell, and Jackman’s active labor market variable (expen- 
ditures on active labor market programs per unemployed worker relative to GDP per capita in 
1982) and ours (the fraction of GDP devoted to active labor market programs ca. 1993) is .82. 
16. Because the sample size is small, in each model we use the largest available sample. This 
leads to different samples of  countries in different years. However, our results are qualitatively 
similar when we restrict the samples to a common set of countries. 290  Anders Forslund and Alan B. Krueger 
Table 6.6  Models for Cross-country Differences in Unemployment, 1983-88 
and 1993 (dependent variable: unemployment rate [%I) 
Year 
Independent Variable  1983-88  1993  1983-88  1993 
ALM spending relative  -  .42  1.73  ...  ... 
to GDP  (1.18)  (1.42) 
ALM spending relative  ...  ...  -8.78  10.19 
to all labor market  (3.19)  (9.49) 
programs 
Union coverage (1-3)  2.68  -  .79  3.00  1.48 
Union coordination (1-3)  -  I .98  1.16  -2.01  1.48 
Employer coordination  -4.42  -5.15  -3.76  -6.31 
(1.38)  (2.12)  (I  .05)  (1.59) 
(34)  (1.57)  (.66)  (1.59) 
( 1-3)  (.77)  (1.22)  (54)  (1.4) 
Unemployment insurance  .I5  .25  .I4  .32 
Unemployment insurance  .96  1.68  .60  1.60 
replacement ratio  ~03)  ~07)  (.02)  ~07) 
duration (years)  (.36)  (.60)  (.36)  ~72) 
Change in inflation  -  .39  -  1.04  -.41  -  .99 
~15)  (39)  (.I31  (.84) 
Sample size  20  19  20  17 
R2-adj.  .85  .63  .9 1  .75 
SE  1.79  2.96  1.41  2.51 
Nore: Standard errors are in parentheses. The ALM (active labor market) spending relative to GDP 
and ALM spending relative to all labor market program variables pertain to 1987 in cols. 1 and 3 
and available years between 1991 and 1993 in cols. 2 and 4 (source: OECD 1993). The change in 
inflation variable is for 1983-87  in cols. 1 and 3 and 1992-93  in cols. 2 and 4 (source: OECD 
Main Economic Indicarors).  All other explanatory variables are from Layard, Nickell, and Jack- 
man (1991). 
ity of unemployment insurance benefits continue to have a positive association 
with the unemployment rate, and an increase in the inflation rate continues to 
have a negative (albeit statistically insignificant) effect on the national unem- 
ployment rate in 1993. 
One could argue that 1993 is an aberration-that  the international evidence 
in other years suggests that active labor market programs have reduced unem- 
ployment. But, together with the statistical issues that we raised previously, we 
think that the results of the updated cross-country regressions challenge the 
favorable impression of  active labor market programs that several observers 
have drawn from international comparisons. 291  An  Evaluation of the Swedish Active Labor Market Policy 
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Fig. 6.5  Persistence of county-level unemployment 
6.7  Comparison of Regional Evolutions 
Finally, we examine the responsiveness of employment and unemployment 
to regional shocks in Sweden. This analysis is motivated by two issues. First, 
if  Sweden’s labor market policies are unusually successful, we  would expect 
economic shocks to have less persistent effects in Sweden than in other coun- 
tries. Second, Sweden’s past record of adjustment to economic shocks may tell 
us something about how the labor market will react to the current economic 
downturn. 
Specifically, we investigate the evolution of employment and unemployment 
using pooled time-series and cross-sectional data for the twenty-four counties 
in Sweden. As a first look, figure 6.5 presents a plot of the unemployment rate 
in  1992 against the unemployment rate in  1976 using data on each of  the 
twenty-four counties in Sweden. There is considerable persistence in the level 
of unemployment across regions in Sweden. This is similar to the pattern found 
for regions in France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom by Decressin 
and Fatas (1993) but quite different from the pattern for states in the United 
States found by  Blanchard and Katz (1992). Figure 6.6 shows a plot of each 
county’s percentage growth in employment between  1983 and  1991 against 
its growth between  1976 and 1983. There appears to be little persistence in 
employment growth rates across counties in Sweden. Again, the pattern for 
Sweden more closely resembles the European pattern found by Decressin and 
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Fig. 6.6  Evolution of county-level employment growth 
Following Blanchard and Katz (1992), we define AT,, as the change between 
year t and t -  1 in the logarithm of employment in county i minus the change 
in the logarithm of employment in  Sweden nationwide between  year t  and 
t -  1. We estimate the same univariate process for employment as Blanchard 
and Katz: 
(2) 
where we allow four lags in  AT,,-^, a,  represents a county fixed effect, and q, 
is an idiosyncratic error term.I7 
Results are presented in table 6.7, and the implied impulse response function 
is shown graphically in figure 6.7. For comparison, we also report Blanchard 
and Katz's estimates for the fifty U.S. states. Regional shocks to relative em- 
ployment have lasting effects in Sweden; they are 86 percent of their original 
size after twenty years. In the United States, regional employment shocks also 
have permanent effects, but they tend to be amplified over time. Interestingly, 
Decressin and Fatas (1993) find that the Swedish pattern  is more typical  of 
other European countries.'8 The United States would thus seem to be the out- 
lier here, not Sweden. 
ATtr  = a,  + PWjAL,  + E,,) 
17. A Dickey-Fuller test did not reveal a unit root in  the Swedish county-level employment 
series. Nevertheless, we estimate the same specifications as Blanchard and Katz for comparability. 
18. Decressin and Fatas's results are not directly comparable to our estimates and to Blanchard 
and  Katz's  because  they  deviate regional employment from countryspecific coefficients times 293  An Evaluation of the Swedish Active Labor Market Policy 
Table 6.7  Univariate Models of Relative Employment and Unemployment 
across Regions 
United States  Sweden 
Coefficient on 
Lagged  A Log  Unemployment  A Log  Unemployment 
Dependent  Employment  Rate  Employment  Rate 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
One lag  .492 




Four lags  -  ,054 
(.022) 
*=  .017 
Sample period  1952-90 
Three lags  .010 
,899  -.lo3  1.020 
(.032)  (.039)  (.051) 
-.I59  -  ,028  -  ,289 
(.033)  (.038)  (.052) 
...  -.026  ... 
(.024) 
...  -  ,003  ... 
(.022) 
.083  ,018  .002 
1972-90  198  1-91  1978-92 
Implied Impulse Responses 
Year  1  1  .oo  1  .oo  1  .oo  1  .oo 
Year 2  1.49  .90  .90  1.02 
Year 3  1.63  .65  .88  .75 
Year 4  1.67  .44  .86  .47 
Year 5  1.62  .29  .86  .26 
Year 10  1.52  .04  .86  .oo 
Year 20  1.53  .o  1  .86  .oo 
Note: Models include state dummies (United States) or county dummies (Sweden). Columns  1 
and 2  are from Blanchard and Katz (1992).  Change in log employment and unemployment rate 
are measured relative to national levels. Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
Next,  we examine the evolution  of  relative unemployment rates. Specifi- 
cally, we follow Blanchard and Katz and estimate 
(3) 
where p,tr is the unemployment rate in county  i in year t minus the aggregate 
unemployment  rate in Sweden in year t, OL~  is a county effect, and klr-L  and 
p,,r-2 are one- and two-year lags of  the relative unemployment rate. 
As shown in table 6.7 (cols. 3 and 4) and figure 6.8,  the relative unemploy- 
ment rate series in both Sweden and the United States displays less persistence 
than the relative employment growth series. Half the effect of an innovation in 
a county’s relative unemployment rate is predicted to dissipate three years after 
aggregate European employment. But their country coefficients are close to one, and they report 
similar results for the United States as Blanchard and Katz when they apply their procedure to 
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Fig. 6.7  Impulse response function, Sweden and United States: Change 
log employment 
the initial shock. Ten years after a shock, the innovation is predicted to have 
completely dissipated. 
The implied impulse response functions for the unemployment rate are quite 
similar in Sweden and the United States, and Decressin and Fatas find a similar 
pattern for regional data in several European countries. Our finding of similar 
regional evolutions in the relative unemployment rate series in  Sweden, the 
United States, and Europe suggests that active labor market programs in Swe- 
den have not had a marked effect on unemployment adjustment in regional 
labor markets in Sweden. 
6.8  Conclusions 
We conclude by considering what our review of the literature and our origi- 
nal analysis imply for the current problems facing the Swedish labor market. 
We  also consider possible lessons from Sweden's experiences for labor market 
policy in the United States and elsewhere. 
One important question that we can partially address is whether the recent 
dramatic increase in unemployment in Sweden is likely to have  a persistent 
effect. We can base our estimate on the estimated unemployment rate equation 
in table 6.7 above if we make two strong assumptions: (1) the regional shocks 
that identify the autoregressive models in table 6.7 have similar effects as the 295  An Evaluation of the Swedish Active Labor Market Policy 
Unemployment Rates  - 
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Fig. 6.8  Impulse response function, Sweden and United States: 
Unemployment rates 
shocks causing the current depression in the Swedish labor market; and (2)  the 
7 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate in Sweden between 1990 
and  1993 is the entire innovation  to the unemployment rate  series. If  these 
assumptions are valid, the coefficients in table 6.7 imply that the Swedish un- 
employment rate will gradually decline but will still be at historically high 
levels for at least the next few years, and probably longer. 
Our analysis also suggests that the active labor market programs are not as 
effective at combatting unemployment or enhancing workers’ skills as some 
observers believe. How might certain policy changes affect the labor market 
programs, especially in the current high-unemployment environment? The an- 
swer to this question is particularly important if the high rate of unemployment 
persists  in  the  future.  Indeed,  relatively  generous  unemployment  benefits 
(compared to the United States) is a reason why one might expect the high rate 
of unemployment to persist. 
First, Sweden’s UI fund benefits are very generous by U.S. standards and are 
available for a long duration. Benefits  last for three hundred days, which is 
more  than  twice  the  maximum  duration of  unemployment  benefits  in  the 
United States. Furthermore, the maximum duration of unemployment benefits 
in Sweden may be effectively longer given the possibility of requalifying for 
benefits after working on public relief jobs or undergoing retraining. The extent 
to which individuals rotate between receiving unemployment benefits and par- 296  Anders Forslund and Alan B. Krueger 
ticipating in labor market programs should be investigated. If this appears to 
be a widespread phenomenon, one possible response would be to limit the total 
duration that individuals may  receive unemployment benefits in a specified 
window of time. 
A second possible response is an expanded set of programs to encourage 
entrepreneurial activity by unemployed workers. Experimental evidence and 
experience in the United States suggests that a minority of unemployed work- 
ers are interested in self-employment and that government assistance can help 
increase the number of unemployed who start their own businesses. For ex- 
ample, the state of Washington has had favorable results from providing unem- 
ployment benefits in a lump sum to those who are interested in obtaining seed 
capital to start their own business (U.S. Department of Labor 1992). In addi- 
tion, training in business activities and other support services may prove useful. 
The social reward to pursuing this kind of a policy is likely to be greater in 
Sweden, where high marginal tax rates discourage entrepreneurial ventures. 
Another possible issue to study is that, to encourage more entrepreneurial ac- 
tivities,  the  government might  allow  some “tax  and  regulation  havens” in 
which start-up businesses are exempted from tax and regulatory requirements 
for a specified period of  time. Although only a small minority of  the unem- 
ployed could possibly become successful entrepreneurs, this is a margin in 
which employment could possibly be expanded, especially in a downturn. 
Third, our review of  studies  of  training  lead us  to the  same conclusion 
reached by Robert Flanagan (1987): “There is disappointingly little evidence 
that these expenditures have improved the productivity of the Swedish work 
force.” Although the handful of studies on the effect of training employ state- 
of-the-art statistical methods, the data have proved insufficient for deriving pre- 
cise estimates of the payoff to training. Aggregating over several studies, we 
conclude that the payoff is modest, at best. The U.S. evidence supports a simi- 
lar conclusion. Furthermore, the immediate benefit of job training when the 
labor market is weak is likely to be smaller than when the labor market is 
strong. An important question  is whether  some training expenditures  could 
be more profitably redirected, perhaps toward programs that would stimulate 
aggregate demand. From a research standpoint, it would be useful if any policy 
changes could be implemented in such a way as to facilitate evaluation of the 
effect of the policies. Specifically, this may include selection of individuals for 
certain policies on the basis of an arbitrary criterion (e.g., birthday falls after 
certain date) and administrative monitoring  of  nonparticipants  and program 
exhaustees for data-collection purposes and subsequent analysis. Finally, our 
results and those of Gramlich and Ysander (1981) suggest that, in the past, 
public relief workers have displaced other workers, on net creating few new 
jobs in the construction sector. It is possible that displacement effects could be 
limited by  requiring local governments to propose new projects in order to 
qualify for relief workers. If public relief work assumes a greater role in the 
current downturn, this issue would be worthy of further study. 297  An Evaluation of the Swedish Active Labor Market Policy 
What does our analysis imply for the  United States? The United States 
seems to be  moving in the opposite direction of  Sweden, having  in 1992 
elected a president with a platform of  “putting people first” by improving the 
skills of the workforce. In addition, unemployment benefits have recently been 
extended in the United States in some regions, whereas the level of benefits 
was recently cut in Sweden. It is possible that both countries are moving in the 
“optimal” direction since the active labor market programs in the United States 
are much smaller than those in Sweden. The optimal level of labor market 
programs may lie somewhere in  between the two countries. Nevertheless, Swe- 
den’s experience that active labor market programs alone are not capable of 
fending off high levels of unemployment should be instructive to the United 
States and other countries. Countries should not expect supernormal returns 
from government labor market programs. Policy makers in Eastern European 
countries who look to Sweden as a model for labor market institutions would 
be well advised to keep this lesson in mind. 
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